TTM4135 Information Security Exam June 6, 2005 --- solutions

| Question | Choice |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | a | b | c |
| 1 |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| 2 | $\checkmark$ |  |  |
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26. The recommendation X.509, part of the X. 500 directory service recommendations, defines a format for public-key certificate that can be issued in a hierarchy of certification authorities. Figure 4.3 shows the formats.
27. 28) Verifiable signature 2) Within validity period.
1. Revocation because : 1) Change of authorization, for instance signer is not at the company anymore. 2) A private key is compromised or lost. 3) Certification system update, for instance algorithmic changes.
2. Invalidation by: 1) Time period expiration. or revocation list (CRL):
2) Revocation of issuer's public key. 3) Revocation of subject's public key.
30. See Section 5 of Security Lab Assignment, and Figure 4.4 in text book.
31. See textbook Figure 7.6.
32. Alice randomly selects two large prime number $p$ and $q$, and computes $n:=p^{*} q$. Then she randomly selects $d$, conditioned on that $d$ is relative prime to $p h i(n)$ and $0<d<p h i(n)$. Alice must keep $p, q$ and $d$ secret.
33. Alice must provide Bob with her public key (e,n), where $e:=d^{\wedge}-1 \bmod p h i(n)$. Bob verifies by checking whether $(s \wedge e \bmod n=m)$.
34. If there are no restrictions on $m^{*}$ then there are no restrictions on $s^{*}$. Bob starts with a random $s^{*}$ and computes $m^{*}:=s^{*} \ell e \bmod n$.
35. The hash function should satisfy: 1) Accept any length input. 2) Fixed length output. 3) 'Easy' to compute $y:=h(x)$. 4) Onewayness: ‘Hard’ to compute $x$ given $h(x)$. 5) Strong collision-free: 'Hard’ to find a pair ( $x 1, x 2$ ) such that $h(x 1)$ $=h(x 2)$.
36. Make $h()$ public. In signing and verification replace $m$ with $h(m)$.
37. Alice computes $\mathrm{E}(K, m)$ and sends the result ( $c, t)$ to Bob. Bob decrypts the message $m$ by computing $c / t \wedge k \bmod p$.
sfm 20050606.
